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OPPORTUNITY COSTS IN THE GAME OF BEST CHOICE
MADELINE CREWS, BRANT JONES, KAITLYN MYERS, LAURA TAALMAN, MICHAEL URBANSKI,
AND BREEANN WILSON
ABSTRACT. The game of best choice, also known as the secretary problem, is a model for sequential de-
cision making with many variations in the literature. Notably, the classical setup assumes that the sequence
of candidate rankings is uniformly distributed over time and that there is no expense associated with the
candidate interviews. Here, we weight each ranking permutation according to the position of the best can-
didate in order to model costs incurred from conducting interviews with candidates that are ultimately not
hired. We compare our weighted model with the classical (uniform) model via a limiting process. It turns
out that imposing even infinitesimal costs on the interviews results in a probability of success that is about
28%, as opposed to 1/e ≈ 37% in the classical case.
1. INTRODUCTION
The game of best choice, or secretary problem, is a model for sequential decision making. In the
simplest variant, an interviewer evaluates a pool of N candidates one by one. After each interview,
the interviewer ranks the current candidate against all of the candidates interviewed so far, and decides
whether to accept the current current candidate (ending the game) or to reject the current candidate (in
which case, they cannot be recalled later). The goal of the game is to hire the best candidate out of N .
It turns out that the optimal strategy for large N is to reject an initial set of N/e candidates and hire the
next candidate who is better than all of them (or the last candidate if no subsequent candidate is better).
The probability of hiring the best candidate out ofN with this strategy also approaches 1/e. See [GM66]
for an introduction to these results. Many other variations and some history have been given in [Fer89]
and [Fre83].
We model interview orderings as permutations. The permutation pi of N is expressed in one-line
notation as [pi1pi2 · · ·piN ] where the pii consist of the elements 1, 2, . . . , N (so each element appears ex-
actly once). In the best choice game, pii is the rank of the ith candidate interviewed in reality, where
rank N is best and 1 is worst. What the player sees at each step, however, are relative rankings. For
example, corresponding to the interview order pi = [2516374], the player sees the sequence of permuta-
tions 1, 12, 231, 2314, 24153, 241536, 2516374 and must use only this information to determine when to
accept a candidate, thereby ending the game.
LetSN be the set of all permutations of size N . Given some statistic c : SN → N and a positive real
number θ, we define a discrete probability distribution on SN via
f(pi) =
θc(pi)∑
pi∈SN θ
c(pi)
.
Given a sequence of i distinct integers, we define its flattening to be the unique permutation of {1, 2, . . . , i}
having the same relative order as the sequence. Given a permutation pi, define the ith prefix flattening,
denoted pi|[i], to be the permutation obtained by flattening the sequence pi1, pi2, . . . , pii. In the weighted
game of best choice, introduced in [Jon19], some pi ∈ SN is chosen randomly, with probability f(pi),
and each prefix flattening pi|[1], pi|[2], . . . is presented sequentially to the player. If the player stops at value
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N , they win; otherwise, they lose. We are interested in calculating the win probability, under optimal
play, for finite N as well as in the limit as N →∞.
In this note, we follow a suggestion by the first author to let c(pi) be the position of the largest ele-
ment in pi, indexed starting from 0; that is, c(pi) = pi−1(N) − 1. Equivalently, this is the number of
“wasted” interviews required before we can hire the best candidate. Setting θ < 1 has the effect of
imposing a multiplicative cost of θ on each wasted interview. For example, the best candidate being
hired immediately will contribute 1 = θ0 (before normalization) to the win probability, whereas each
failed interview reduces the contribution of an eventually successful hire by a factor of θ. This weighted
model is relevant when the interviews themselves are costly, or if time spent interviewing detracts from
the time spent working productively such as when the position being filled is only for a limited term
or requires a substantial training investment. Also, observe that when θ = 1, we recover the complete
uniform distribution on SN , corresponding to the classical model.
We obtain some interesting behavior vis-a`-vis the classical model. The optimal strategy is still po-
sitional, for which we reject about 0.435/(1 − θ) initial candidates and select the next best candidate.
As N → ∞ and θ → 1, however, this strategy succeeds about 28% of the time even though we have a
1/e ≈ 37% success rate at θ = 1. That is, the asymptotically optimal strategy does not vary continu-
ously with the parameter θ which seems to limit the durability of any “policy advice” derived from the
classical model (such as e.g. [SV99]). We found a similar discontinuity in the optimal strategy for the
Mallows model in [Jon19], although the success probability there still approached 1/e. In the present
model, both the strategy and probability of success are discontinuous. Evidently, there is a “price” of
about 8.6% in the asymptotic success rate for imposing any wasted interview penalty, no matter how
small.
Although there is an established “full-information” version of the game in which the player observes
values from a given distribution, it seems that only a few papers have considered nonuniform rank dis-
tributions for the secretary problem. Pfeifer [Pfe89] considers the case where interview ranks are inde-
pendent but have cumulative distribution functions containing parameters determined by the interview
positions. The paper [RF88] considers an explicit continuous probability distribution that allows for de-
pendencies between nearby arrival ranks via a single parameter. Inspired by approximation theory, the
paper [KKN15] studies some general properties of non-uniform rank distributions in the secretary prob-
lem. Our work also fits into a recent stream of asymptotic results for random permutations by researchers
in algebraic combinatorics such as [MP14, CDE18, ABNP16].
2. THE MODEL
The left-to-right maxima in a permutation pi consist of elements pij that are larger in value than every
element pii to the left (i.e. for i < j). In the game of best choice, it is never optimal to select a candidate
that is not a left-to-right maximum. A positional strategy for the game of best choice is one in which the
interviewer transitions from rejection to hiring based only on the position of the interview (as opposed
to adjusting the transition based on the prefix flattenings that are encountered). More precisely, the in-
terviewer may play the r-positional strategy on a permutation pi by rejecting candidates pi1, pi2, . . . , pir
and then accepting the next left-to-right maximum thereafter. We say that a particular interview rank
order is r-winnable if transitioning from rejection to hiring after the rth interview captures the best can-
didate. For example, 574239618 is r-winnable for r = 2, 3, 4, and 5. It is straightforward to verify that a
permutation pi is r-winnable precisely when position r lies between the last two left-to-right maxima in
pi.
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It follows from the results in [Jon19, Section 3] that the optimal strategy in our game of best choice is
positional 1, and we let
WN (r) =
∑
r-winnable pi ∈ SN
θpi
−1(N)−1.
Theorem 2.1. We have the recurrence
WN (r) = (N − 1)WN−1(r) + r(N − 2)!θN−1
with initial conditionsW1(0) = 1 andW1(r) = 0 for all r ≥ 1.
Proof. There are two cases for the r-winnable permutations pi ofN . IfN does not lie in the last position,
then we may view the initial segment of pi uniquely as an r-winnable permutation of N −1 by flattening.
Since there are N − 1 possible values for the last position, this case contributes (N − 1)WN−1(r) to
WN (r). If N lies in the last position, then pi will be winnable if and only if N − 1 lies in one of the first
r positions of pi. For each of these choices, we may permute the remaining entries in (N − 2)! ways, so
these contribute r(N − 2)!θN−1 all together. 
Corollary 2.2. We have
WN (r) =

(N − 1)! if r = 0
(N − 1)! r
N−1∑
i=r
θi
i if 1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1
Proof. This follows from Theorem 2.1 by induction. 
Theorem 2.3. Fix some positive θ 6= 1. The probability of winning the game of best choice using the
strategy that rejects r initial candidates is
Pr(N, θ) =
r(1− θ)∑N−1i=r θii
1− θN
if r > 0 and is 1−θ
1−θN if r = 0.
Proof. By definition, the probability of winning is( ∑
r-winnable pi∈SN
θc(pi)
) / ( ∑
pi∈SN
θc(pi)
)
=
WN (r)
(N − 1)!(1 + θ + θ2 + · · ·+ θN−1) .
The result then follows from the previous corollary. 
3. RESULTS
Suppose now that θ < 1, and take the limit as N → ∞. Then the probability of success for the
strategy that initially rejects r candidates becomes
Pr(θ) = r(1− θ)
∞∑
i=r
θi
i
.
1Briefly, our statistic c(pi) = pi−1(N) − 1 is essentially prefix equivariant [Jon19, Definition 3.2] in the sense that c(pi) −
c(σq · pi) = 0 = c(12 · · · k)− c(q) for all eligible prefixes q. This is enough to obtain the results in [Jon19, Theorem 3.4] and
subsequently [Jon19, Theorem 3.7].
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FIGURE 1. The first few asymptotic curves P0, P1, . . .
We obtain a curve for each nonnegative value of r (interpreting P0 as 1−θ), the first several of which we
have plotted in Figure 1. For each value of θ, one of the curves is maximal, yielding the optimal strategy
and probability of success. For example,
r = 0 1 2 3
is optimal for θ ∈ (0, 0.6321] [0.6321, 0.7968] [0.7968, 0.8609] [0.8609, 0.8945]
Lemma 3.1. For each i, the intersection of Pi−1 and Pi coincides with the maximum value of Pi.
Proof. To see this, the derivative of Pr with respect to θ is
r(1− θ)
∞∑
i=r
θi−1 − r
∞∑
i=r
θi
i
= r(1− θ) θ
r−1
1− θ − r
∞∑
i=r
θi
i
= r
(
θr−1 −
∞∑
i=r
θi
i
)
.
whereas the successive differences Pr−1 − Pr are
(1− θ)
(
((r − 1)− r)
∞∑
i=r
θi
i
)
+ (r − 1)(1− θ) θ
r−1
r − 1 = (1− θ)
(
θr−1 −
∞∑
i=r
θi
i
)
.
Hence,
Pr−1 − Pr = 1− θ
r
dPr
dθ
so the successive differences and derivatives have the same zeros. 
The first intersection occurs at θ = 1 − 1/e with value P = 1/e. Subsequent intersections can be
estimated numerically but have no elementary closed form:
r ddθPr solution for
d
dθPr = 0 value of Pr
1 ln(−θ + 1) + 1 θ = 1− 1/e ≈ 0.63212 1/e ≈ 0.36788
2 4θ + 2 ln(−θ + 1) θ ≈ 0.796812 0.323805
3 9/2θ2 + 3θ + 3 ln(−θ + 1) θ ≈ 0.860917 0.309256
4 16/3θ3 + 2θ2 + 4θ + 4 ln(−θ + 1) θ ≈ 0.894457 0.302113
5 25/4θ4 + 5/3θ3 + 5/2θ2 + 5θ + 5 ln(−θ + 1) θ ≈ 0.915009 0.297883
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FIGURE 2. The maximum (α, β) for xE1(x)
Thus, the optimal strategy and probability of success is determined by P (θ) = max
r≥0
Pr(θ), the maxi-
mum Pr function in the regime determined by θ. By Lemma 3.1, P (θ) is monotonically decreasing and
bounded below. Hence, there is a limiting value as θ → 1. However, the limit is clearly bounded away
from 1/e, which is the value at θ = 1 according to the classical analysis. Our goal in this section is to
determine limθ→1 P (θ) more precisely.
Recall the exponential integral
E1(x) =
∫ ∞
x
e−t
t
dt
which we view as a function of a positive real variable x (see e.g. [OLBC10]). This is a standard special
function implemented in many mathematical software systems.
For our main result, we consider the maximum value attained by the related function F (x) = xE1(x)
on (0,∞); see Figure 2 for a plot. Although there is no elementary form for this maximum, it occurs
where E1(x) = e−x so can be estimated numerically to arbitrary precision. Let α and β be defined by
F ′(α) = 0 and F (α) = β. Then, α ≈ 0.43481821500399293 and β ≈ 0.28149362995691674.
We are now in a position to give our main result.
Theorem 3.2. As θ approaches 1 from the left, the optimal strategy in our asymptotic weighted game
of best choice approaches a positional strategy that rejects α1−θ initial candidates and selects the next
candidate better than all of them. This strategy has a success probability of β.
Proof. We would like to optimize Pr(θ) = r(1−θ)
∑∞
i=r
θi
i for large r and θ chosen appropriately close
to 1. We estimate the series by viewing it as a left or right sum for the corresponding integrals:∫ ∞
t=r
θt
t
dt <
∞∑
i=r
θi
i
<
∫ ∞
t=r
θt−1
t− 1 dt =
∫ ∞
t=r−1
θt
t
dt.
Hence, we may approximate Pr(θ) by P˜r(θ) = r(1− θ)
∫∞
t=r
θt
t dt with error less than
r(1− θ) θ
r−1
r − 1 < 4(1− θ)θ
r
since the integrand is decreasing, r − 1 > r/2, and θ > 1/2.
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Next, we change variables from r to c = (1 − θ)r, and from t to u = (1 − θ)t in the integral. We
obtain du = (1− θ) dt so
P˜c(θ) = c
∫ ∞
u=c
(
θ1/(1−θ)
)u
u
du.
and our error estimate for |P − P˜ | becomes 4θc/(1−θ)(1− θ).
Now, we are in a position to take the limit as θ → 1, using limθ→1 θ1/(1−θ) = 1/e. This forces
P → P˜ by our error estimate, and
P˜c → c
∫ ∞
u=c
e−u
u
du = cE1(c).
Optimizing this function for c ∈ (0,∞) then determines the asymptotically optimal positional strategy
(where we reject r = c1−θ initial candidates) and probability of success. 
We can also solve the model when θ > 1. One interpretation here is that there is some “trend” in the
candidate pool (e.g. due to changes in general economic conditions such as unemployment or interest
rates) that is amplifying the probability of seeing the best candidate later. Once again, we find that
including even an infinitesimal trend completely changes the optimal asymptotic strategy.
Theorem 3.3. If θ > 1, the probability of success for the strategy that initially rejects r = Nλ candidates
approaches 1/λ, as N →∞. Hence, the asymptotic model does not depend on θ.
Proof. Recall Theorem 2.3; we claim
lim
N→∞
PN/λ(N, θ) = lim
N→∞
N(1− θ)
λ(1− θN )
N−1∑
i=N/λ
θi
i
=
1
λ
.
To see why, consider the “almost telescoping” sum
(1− θ)
N−1∑
i=N/λ
θi
i
=
1
N/λ
θN/λ − 1
N − 1θ
N −
N−1∑
i=(N/λ)+1
1
i(i− 1)θ
i.
If we divide by −θN and take the limit N → ∞ term by term with θ > 1, we find that only the leading
(i.e. middle) term survives. Hence, our limit is limN→∞ Nλ(1−θN )
(
− 1N−1θN
)
= 1λ . 
Thus, for large N we find that it is optimal to choose the last candidate (and win almost all of the
time!), obtaining another discontinuity with the θ < 1 and classical models.
ADDENDUM
Although we were unaware of it until after our work was accepted for publication, the paper [Ras75] solves a very similar
problem to the one we are considering. More specifically, we compute in Theorem 2.3 the probability of winning the game of
best choice under a non-uniform distribution whereas Rasmussen–Pliska compute in their Equation (2.6) the expected value of
a random variable representing the non-uniform payoff for the game played on a uniform distribution. For any particular N
and θ, these problems are dual to each other in the sense that their corresponding formulas are off by the multiplicative constant
θ+θ2+θ3+...+θN
N
. Since our weights form a probability distribution, we believe our model facilitates a clearer comparison with
the classical secretary problem.
When 0 < θ < 1, Rasmussen–Pliska obtain an asymptotic estimate for the optimal strategy that agrees with ours, using
different methods. They also note that, for fixed θ < 1, their expected payoff tends to 0 as N tends to infinity (because their
denominator does not scale with θ). By contrast, our model has nonzero probabilities, as N tends to infinity, given by the value
of Pr(θ) where r is optimal for the fixed θ.
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